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Human Security has sparked remarkable turmoil throughout the epistemic com-munity of international relations during the last years1. Being on the one hand po-pularized by international organizations 
like the United Nations2, on the other hand proclaimed as a 
practical foreign policy posture by states like Japan, Norway 
and Canada, this apparently innovative concept of security 
imposes itself to the scientific discussion. Human securi-
ty refers to the human being and its individual security as 
a pattern of international relations, widening thereby the 
scientific perspective to threats beyond military security 
taking into account interrelated problems of under-deve-
lopment and human rights3. This orientation represents in 
fact a crucial contestation to the current hegemonic para-
digms of realism and neo-realism with their concentration 
on interstate security competition. However, there is not 
only dispute about questions of analysis and explication, 
but also divergence concerning the normative character 
of this new paradigm. Human Security claims to deliver 
an analytical framework for research and explanation of 
Special thanks to Jan Schmitz, Pawel Radchenko, Tatjana 
Radchenko, and Nina Hall for their helpful contributions.
security problems, but moreover, as a normative concept, 
it also demands to be a practical signpost fully applicable 
to foreign policy. Such a political predisposition renders 
the emerging paradigm of Human Security especially sen-
sitive to reproaches put forward by competing schools of 
thought in international relations theory: Is the concept 
nothing but idealistic hot air4, inapt to confront the rough 
reality of an anarchic international system which forces all 
states to care but for their own national interest? Doubting 
the applicability of the Human Security paradigm to real 
politics means neglecting an essential component and mo-
tif of Human Security as a whole, committing thereby a 
deadly blow to its legitimacy. Putting it simply: Who needs 
a signpost signing nothing but abstract theory?
The first part of this paper will show that it is mislea-
ding to assert an incongruence between Human Security 
and the promotion of the national interest of the state. It 
will be shown that the assumption of a somehow deter-
mined national interest, above all defended by (neo-) re-
alist theory, defects on grounds of a profound misunders-
tanding of the formation of interest. In the second part, 
the paper will present an alternative ideational concept of 
interest-formation, describing it as a composite reflection 
of narrow intersubjective needs as well as profound nor-
mative predispositions, being however neither rational nor 
irrational in character. Once established this argument, the 
conjured up tension between the national interest and an 
application of Human Security in the realm of foreign po-
licy is solved, and the political character of an adoption or 
36  CARTA INTERNACIONAL      JULHO 2006
non-adoption is reconstituted.
Interest as an objectively deductible pattern in liberal 
and realist theory
Realist critics of Human Security object that States are 
principally interested in their own security and do not in 
general care about the “fear” or “need” of other people as 
long as primary national interests are not at stake. The con-
sideration of human rights plays at best a marginal role 
in the great gamble of power-politics in the context of an 
international struggle for security, power and position. 
Hence, insofar as human security is not promoting the na-
tional interest of the state, it can be discarded as an irra-
tional and even risky adventure originating from a some-
times idealistic human mind5. The mounting criticism of 
“realist” conservatives inside the Republican Party towards 
the neo-conservative politics of the Bush administration, 
setting the promotion of liberal democracy worldwide as 
a strategic goal6, portrays a such refusal of a normative-
ly loaded foreign policy aiming at the spreading of libe-
ral democracy all over the world: “As we wage war today 
to keep the world safe from terror, we must also work to 
make the world a better place for all its citizens.7” Against 
such an understanding of American internationalism, the 
two prominent realist scientists Stephen Walt and John J. 
Mearsheimer haven taken a clear stance, especially against 
the intervention in Iraq: “Although the United States would 
almost certainly win such a war, armed conflict with Iraq 
would divert resources and attention from the more im-
portant task of eliminating the terrorist threat. (…). In 
short, an invasion of Iraq is the wrong war in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.”8 Underlying a such view of inter-
national relations, most clearly explained in Waltz Theory 
of International Politics, is the theoretical presupposition 
that states do have a rationally deductible and objective-
ly identifiable national interest. Thus, the realist discourse 
in international security concerns primarily the question 
of how to promote the national interest or, to put in an 
economical term: how to maximise the utility of the state. 
For the case of Iraq, it is apparent that many realists are 
at odds with their “missionary” neo-conservative counter-
parts, reproaching them the pursuit of ideological politics 
detrimental to the promotion of the national interest. Of 
course, such a blame refers to all forms of “ideology”, inclu-
ding naturally the paradigm of Human Security, which are 
not supposed to maximise the national interest. In order 
to come to grips with this reproach we have to answer the 
question: What is the national interest and how is it cons-
tituted? To understand the notion of the term national in-
terest, it is essential to understand its philosophical origin 
and conception.
Following the classical thoughts of utilitarianism for-
mulated by Bentham and Mill, every human being is dri-
ven by the desire to achieve as much happiness as possible 
and to avoid pain. The objective of ethical politics, based 
on this endeavour to achieve “happiness”, should thus be 
to promote the quantitative maximization of good conse-
quences for a population. Liberal economics grasped this 
thought applying it in a particular fashion to their thinking 
by equating “happiness” with the materially measura-
ble maximization of the consumption of goods; because 
everybody is striving for hap-
piness, that is nothing else but 
the maximization of utility, 
everybody tries to achieve the 
maximization of consump-
tion. This is an essential point 
because it enables the liberal 
theory to define utility regard-
less of the actors socialisation, 
culture and normative predis-
position. The theoretical clue of this perspective is the pos-
sibility to objectify the utility of agents by establishing that 
everybody is an egoistic and rational maximizer of its own 
consumption, a so called homo oeconomicus. People can 
maximize their utility, or putting it in the political term 
“interest”, in optimal or suboptimal ways, but they do not 
define their utility in a fashion of striving or not striving 
for happiness/consumption. Being for example born into a 
wealthy family, it would be rational to demand lower taxes, 
to engage against systems of redistribution and adhering to 
a liberal party, this way maximising efficiently the indivi-
dual opportunity to consume goods now and in the futu-
re. The other way around, being born into a poor working 
class environment should spark the motivation to fight for 
higher taxes, a more equal distribution of wealth and to 
engage in a labour party. It is noteworthy to state that this 
scheme works only as long as the poor are not becoming 
rich, because from that moment on the nouveau riche will 
change their preferences according to their new social po-
sition by joining a liberal party. Given such a reconfigura-
tion of circumstances, it would simply not be rational for 
an egoistic maximizer of utility to fight for higher taxes. 
The key point here is that liberal thought determines utility 
and interest principally as an intersubjective and rationally 
deductible pattern, which can be more or less efficiently 
maximized. Changes of outcome are rather explained by 
external factors than by intrinsic phenomena. The former-
ly poor and now nouveau riche do not change their prefe-
rences because of a change caused by an insight that liberal 
Human Security refers to the human being and its individual 
security as a pattern of international relations, widening 
thereby the scientific perspective to threats beyond military 
security and taking into account problems of under-
development and human rights. 
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values are morally superior to socialist values. The change 
of political preferences was rather caused by the change in 
social position, rendering now the defence of liberal values 
congruent with their own interest in the maximization of 
consumption. This change of preference is therefore cons-
tituted exogenously by a change in the environment, and 
not by an endogenous change in values held by the agent. 
Hence, interest is a function of exogenous circumstances. 
There is no variation in liberal theory between different 
people, different cultures or different histories, because 
all human beings can be regarded as black boxes driven 
by the same motivation in striving for the maximization 
of consumption. The consequence is an exclusion of en-
dogenous ideational predispositions hold by the agent as 
an explanation for interest. Interest has been externalized 
with reference to the maximization of consumption, it is 
therefore constituted exogenously by the environment. 
Wendt is right to state that “neo-classical economists (…) 
try to avoid making substantial assumptions about actors 
psychology by explaining varying outcomes through refe-
rence to changing prices in the environment rather than 
changing preferences.”9 With the assumption of the homo 
oeconomicus as a unitary and egoistic utility-maximizer, 
liberal thought conceptualises agents as black boxes.
The above explained consideration of egoistic self-re-
garding black-box agents found its way directly into the 
neo-realist paradigm. This is a barely astonishing fact re-
garding the strong impetus liberal economics had on the 
conception of Waltz Theory of International Politics. In 
fact, Waltz is very clear about the analogy between market 
and international system: “(…) the parallel with market 
theory is exact. Both states and firms are like units. Though 
all of their variations in form, firms share certain qualities: 
They are self-regarding units that (…) decide for themsel-
ves how to cope with their environment  and just how to 
work for their ends. Variation in structure is introduced, 
not through differences in the character and function of 
the units, but only through distinctions made among them 
according to their capabilities.”10 Neo-realism as a struc-
tural theory claims to abstract from unit-level attributes, 
this way excluding variations in normative or psycholo-
gical predispositions. The only behavioural assumption 
established is that states are egoistic and above all concer-
ned about their own security. Different “national interests” 
derive therefore not from endemic varying attributes of 
agents but from exogenous variations of structure. For the 
explanation of national interest in neo-realism it does not 
matter whether a given state X is a democracy or dictator-
ship, but whether it is placed on the upper or lower end of 
the power hierarchy. By ruling out endemic attributes and 
in ascribing to external factors the status of an independent 
variable to explain interest, neo-realism reflects a liberal 
ontology of rational interest. In consequence, neo-realists 
argue that a foreign policy not promoting the security and 
power of the state suffers from a deficient maximization 
of the national interest. Making whole-hearted efforts to 
provide for human security might seem morally decent. 
However, decency may mostly be an unaffordable luxury 
under a merciless international anarchy and the fight for 
power and position. Distracting valuable resources from 
the realization of primary, that is egoistic, needs to altruis-
tic ends means in this perspective always an imposition of 
opportunity costs, thus a suboptimal way to maximize the 
rational “national interest”. Given this argument, a practi-
cal application of human security as a doctrine of foreign 
policy would always be in tension, or even contradiction, 
to the realization of the national interest.
Security is what states make of it
Human Security, nothing but a devout wish of starry-
eyed idealists out of touch with reality? In fact, there is no 
theoretical evidence to believe so. On the contrary, there 
is rather good reason to doubt the theoretical foundation 
of neo-realist assumptions about the formation of “natio-
nal interest” and therefore the criticism posed  to Human 
Security by it. Neglecting the endogenous dimension of 
agency, neo-realism rules out ideational factors like nor-
ms, socialisation and identity in order to conceptualise 
exogenous factors as independent variables having causal 
influence on interest. In sta-
ting self-regardedness as well 
as power- or security-seeking 
as constant motivational attri-
butions of states, the explana-
tory role falls to the changing 
factor of the external environ-
ment in which the state tries to maximize its interest in a 
rational-choice manner. Hence, given a particularly speci-
fied external environment and the assumption of the above 
mentioned constant motivational attributes of agency, it is 
possible to state an objective and rational national interest 
which can be more or less efficiently maximized by the sta-
te. It is this conclusion which can be doubted.
Interests are only limitedly objective in character and 
essentially subjectively constituted by ideational factors. 
Even if neo-realism is right to label “security” a basic mo-
tivation for states, the question remains unanswered how 
security is defined. State behaviour can hardly be explained 
by an underspecified strive for security by self-regarding 
actors. Integrating norms, identities and socialisation as 
endogenous factors to a model of interest-formation can 
help a great deal to understand state-behaviour as well as 
the dynamic “political” character of interest. I argue that 
The orientation proposed by Human Security represents a 
crucial contestation to the current hegemonic paradigms of 
realism and neo-realism.
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the formation of “national interest” is a function of funda-
mental exogenous factors as well as endogenous ideational 
variables. The exogenous factors set effective borderlines 
for the pursuit of interest, binding thereby every actor in 
the system. The endogenous ideational components define 
the national interest through norms, identity and socialisa-
tion. It may be though consensual that all states are bound 
by the necessity to save survival and security. However, the 
national interest itself is defined by identity and norms of 
the agent itself and can not be regarded as the function of 
environmental patterns. Ideas give in this sense for exam-
ple content to security by defining a concept of security: 
Security of the narrow nation state? The members of an 
Alliance? A particular group of, for example democratic, 
states? Or even all human beings like in the concept of 
human security? Interest can not be stated objectively be-
cause it is subjective by its nature; furthermore, it can be 
rationally strived for but not being itself rational. 
Ideas and socialisation define the fashion, in which en-
vironment and behaviour of other agents is interpreted, 
categorized and evaluated. These cognitive processes can 
lead to extremely different interpretations of reality and 
its meaning to the agent, depending on its normal pre-
dispositions and, noteworthy, independent of changes in 
environment. History and socialisation play a crucial role 
in forming interest: At the start of the 20th Century, the 
German military build-up was regarded by its European 
neighbours as a dangerous challenge to their national se-
curities. In contrast, Germany has proved to be a reliable, 
calculable and above all friendly partner in Europe during 
the second part of the 20th century: the practise of institu-
tionalised cooperation of normatively “coherent” states in 
the Euro-Atlantic community, above all in NATO and the 
European Community, functioned over the last 60 years 
as successful means to build up confidence and friendship 
between the states of the Western hemisphere. Hence, 
comparable politics in the year 2006 are not anymore re-
garded as a threat to the national security of France, Britain 
or Luxembourg, but rather welcomed as a step forward to 
empower European or NATO capabilities. Neglecting the 
importance of socialisation and changing identities of sta-
tes would thus be a profound misunderstanding of the dy-
namics of international relations. Applying these factors to 
the definition of security, the German Empire for example 
defined its national interest, identity and role in the inter-
national system 100 years ago in dissociation to France 
and Britain, whereas the Federal Republic nowadays iden-
tifies its own security as inseparably attached to that of its 
European neighbours. Wendt and other scientists have 
extensively worked on the question of norm-constitution, 
socialisation and culture11, the present paper will therefore 
concentrate in the subsequent section on the influence of 
ideational factors on state behaviour.
It was argued that interest can not necessarily be an 
objective product of exogenous factors but has to be un-
derstood as the function of endogenous and exogenous 
attributes of agents. An illustration of the subjective cha-
racter of the national interest and its dependency on ide-
ational concepts is the Spanish governmental change in 
2004: After the terrorist attack in Madrid on march 11, the 
conservative government under Aznar lost the national 
elections and had to handover power to the socialist party 
under Zapatero. While the former was a steadfast cham-
pion of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was supposedly 
not to change this course, the later announced and carried 
out immediately the retreat of all Spanish troops after his 
victory. Furthermore, he aligned his country ostentatiou-
sly with the intervention-critics Chirac and Schröder and 
ceased the blocking of the European Constitution, thereby 
taking detrimental positions in foreign policy with regard 
to his predecessor. How is this explainable? What changed 
was neither the relative position of Spain in the internatio-
nal system nor in the European Union: It has to be stated 
that although the terrorist attack caused enormous suffer 
and meant a shock to the Spanish as well as European pu-
blics, it did not change the Spanish power position in the 
international arena. There was neither a causal influence 
on aggregate national military capabilities nor a lasting 
economical impact. What changed was the conception 
of the national interest based on differing normative pre-
dispositions and different self-images, roles and identities 
of Spain in Europe and the inter-
national system, induced by the 
change of government from Aznar 
to Zapatero. Obviously, the two 
party leaders stood for significan-
tly different position regarding the 
international role of Spain, thus 
resulting in different definitions of 
the national interest. The turn in the “national interest” of 
Spain can hardly be called ir/rational or objectively more 
or less advantageous regarding utility, because both attri-
butes can not be attached to the category of “interest”. Neo-
realists have serious trouble to explain the turn in Spain’s 
foreign policy, because there are only two possibilities to 
explain its results following their presuppositions: Either 
there was a deep shift in relative power-positions in the 
international system, or one of the two governments acted 
irrational in disrespecting the maximization of the national 
interest. The first possibility can be ruled out easily because 
of the short time-span between the shift in foreign policy 
orientations as well as of the assumption that a conserva-
Interests are only limitedly objective in character and 
essentially subjectively constituted by ideational factors. 
The national interest is neither objectively definable nor 
rationally deductible. 
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tive government would have continued the already cho-
sen way. The second possibility is more tricky to resolve: 
The Aznar and Zapatero governments implemented totally 
contradictory foreign policies in questions of highest im-
portance for Spain. The assumption that one of the two go-
vernments ceased caring about the national interest would 
thus imply that it actually acted detrimentally to the na-
tional interest. How is it possible to choose the “bad guy”? 
Obviously both governments had comprehensible reasons 
for their policies with respect to their different conceptions 
of interest, and it is impossible to state that one of the two 
acted doubtlessly crazy or irrational. A closing answer to 
this question can not be found, thus undermining the neo-
realist argument that one of the two governments acted ir-
rational and deficiently with regard to the national interest. 
There is simply no objectively determinable national inte-
rest that could show politicians the best path to maximise 
the nations utility in a precise case like the discussed one. 
What can be stated is that the formation of interest is a 
function of subjective ideational predispositions, and that 
this formation is of endogenously dynamic character. The 
national interest is what states make of it12, being neither 
objectively definable nor rationally deductible. Like all 
normative decisions, the definition of interest is a political 
choice being only to a small part materially constrained. 
Hence, a change in government can lead to profound shifts 
in conceptions of interests, even if there are particular ban-
dwidths intraversable at least for western-style democra-
cies with a core of domestically shared consensual identi-
ties. The notion of rationality, although not applicable to 
interests itself, can however be understood in an instru-
mental fashion: Ideational endogenous variables constitute 
within a framework of exogenous factors the interest of an 
agent, which can then be rationally strived for. Contrary 
to everyday language, rationality is disconnected from the 
constitution of interest but a means to attain the objectives 
set by the interest. Taking up once again the example of a 
nouveau riche worker: In contrast to the liberal/realist mo-
del of interest constitution, it is probable that he will still 
stick to his socialised values of solidarity and social justice 
although his circumstances of life have changed. His inte-
rest can thus be interpreted as the function of ideational 
factors including normative predispositions, identity and 
socialisation to a certain environment with certain proble-
ms. Given a such interest, the nouveau riche will however 
use its rationality to strive for his aims, that is to achieve 
his goals in the most efficient way possible. Rationality is 
therefore an instrument to achieve certain aims determi-
ned by the individual interest, being itself the function 
of mainly ideational attributes endogenous to the agent. 
Another hard illustration for this phenomenon would be 
an individual with an interest in killing himself and others 
in a suicide-bombing. Although incomprehensible, this 
constitutes for whatever reasons an interest, which can be 
rationally strived for. A such killer has thus for given rea-
sons an interest in committing suicide while killing as many 
people as possible. He will though not chose to detonate on 
an abandoned field but search to accomplish his mission in 
a crowd of people; a rationally chosen behaviour.
The above mentioned explications and examples show 
that the liberal and neo-
realist ontological as-
sumption of an objecti-
ve and rational interest 
given exogenously to 
agents ideational predis-
positions is in fact a pro-
found misunderstanding 
and a failure of category of the term interest. This signifies 
in consequence that the promotion of the national interest 
has not to be viewed as a contradiction to the application 
of a Human Security agenda. A such conception of foreign 
policy is as much justified as other conceptions, and it rests 
therefore a merely political question to define the natio-
nal interest in a correspondent fashion. The instauration of 
Human Security as a policy guideline by the governments 
of Canada, Japan and Sweden marks a powerful point in 
favour of this emerging paradigm. A refusal of adoption 
can, therefore, no longer be founded in an alleged tension 
between Human Security and the national interest, but has 
to be clarified as a political decision supported by an expli-
cit definition of the states interest. A such re-politicization 
can in the long term support the cause of Human Security 
by disclosing the normative and political foundations of 
national foreign policies, withdrawing them from the re-
alm of untouchable technocratic experts specialised in the 
art of determining the best way to maximise optimally the 
national interest. 
Paradigmatic shift and Human Security in international 
relations theory
Since the end of the cold war, the hegemonic paradigm 
of (neo-)realism has faced mounting criticism by schools 
like constructivism, neo-intuitionalism as well as Human 
Security. Are the questions, tools and answers of  the “rea-
list” tradition still capable to explain international relations? 
It is noteworthy that contemporary economists are incre-
asingly willing to introduce sociological and psychological 
suppositions to their theories in order to square “anoma-
lies”: for his work on psychological factors in economics, 
Daniel Kahnemann even received the Nobel Price in 2002. 
Will international political theory also undergo a similar 
There is no evidence to believe the claim that Human Security 
is nothing but a devout wish of starry-eyed idealists out of touch 
with reality. On the contrary, there is rather good reason to doubt 
the theoretical foundation of realism and neo-realism.
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paradigmatic shift during the coming years, abandoning 
well established and comfortable patterns of thinking in 
order to revise overcome theoretical axioms? Following 
Thomas Kuhns work on the structure of scientific revo-
lutions13, an emerging paradigms must not only explain 
reality, but have to perform better than its scientific com-
petitors. The present work was aimed to support this en-
deavour in favour of Human Security: the first part of the 
paper showed that there is a certain ontological deficiency 
in realism committing a categorical failure discerning the 
notion of interest. The second part of the present work ex-
plained that the application of Human Security as a postu-
re of foreign policy is not contradictory to the pursuit of 
the national interest, but depends on different normative 
predispositions as well as the political definition of what 
the national interest is about. With regard to the European 
Union for example, one can argue that Human Security, 
irrespective of the nation state, has already become a ta-
cit stance amongst European states. The refutation of the 
alleged contradiction between a Human Security agenda 
and the promotion of the national interest is therefore of 
importance. Defending the ideational and political charac-
ter of the formation of interest against liberal and realistic 
advocates of exogenously given material constraints is an 
essential basis for the scientific and practical legitimacy of 
Human Security as an emerging paradigm in international 
relations theory.
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